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The most litigated estate tax issue concerning life insurance' is whether
the proceeds should be included in the insured's gross estate. This question
usually is governed by section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
the estate tax provision directed specifically at life insurance. While the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 wrought enormous changes in many areas of estate
taxation, Congress did not change section 2042. Thus the several unresolved
questions concerning the interpretation of that section remain unsettled. 2
But the question of the includability of life insurance proceeds in the
gross estate of the insured is not always governed by section 2042. It
sometimes turns on one of the other sections of the Code, notably section
2035. This Article will deal with the treatment under section 2035 of various
types of transactions concerning life insurance. Prior to the 1976 amend-
ments, section 2035 required the inclusion of the value of property of all
types, including life insurance, given away by the decedent within three
years of his death if the transfer was "in contemplation of his death." This
test required a determination of the decedent's motives in making the gift. 3
The 1976 Act removed the necessity of making that determination by
substituting an automatic rule requiring the includability of gifts made by the
decedent within three years of his death regardless of motive.4 Thus one of
1963, University of Michigan; D.Phil. 1966, Oxford University.
Portions of this Article are drawn from the authors' book FEDERAL TAXATION OF GIFTS,
TRUSTS AND ESTATES (Little, Brown & Co. 1977).
The authors wish to express their appreciation to Mr. Michael Alan Ellis for his many
useful contributions, and to thank Professors Pamela B. Gann and John Weistart for their
valuable criticisms and comments of a draft of this Article.
1. The terminology used in connection with life insurance may be unfamiliar. The "insur-
er" is the company which issues the insurance policy; the "insured" is the person whose life is
insured by the policy; the "beneficiary" is the person to whom the proceeds of the insurance
are payable; and the "policyholder" is the owner of the policy-that is, the person who
possesses the economic rights in and power over the policy (for example, the right to surrender
the policy for cash, borrow against the policy, name the beneficiary, and the like). Note that the
policyholder need not also be the insured.
2. See, e.g., Estate of Connelly v. United States, 551 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1977) (power to
elect settlement option, and thus to affect proceeds' payment schedule, the exercise of which
required consent of employer and insurer, did not constitute an "incident of ownership" under
§ 2042); Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977
(1976) (power, as a trustee, to elect a settlement option constituted an "incident of ownership"
even though insured's wife could terminate his power at will); Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d
259 (5th Cir. 1975) (power, as a trustee, to alter time and manner of enjoyment of policy held in
trust constituted an "incident of ownership"); Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699
(2d Cir. 1972) (broad fiduciary powers conveyed to, and not retained by, an insured did not
constitute an "incident of ownership"). See also Rev. Rul. 76-261, 1976-2 C.B. 276 (addressing
the same issue presented in Skifter but ruling to the contrary).
3. See, e.g., Berman v. United States, 487 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1973) (where such a determina-
tion of subjective intent was made).
4. I.R.C. § 2035(a), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §
2001(a)(5), 90 Stat. 1848.
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the problems concerning the application of section 2035 to transfers with
respect to life insurance has been eliminated. A number of problems remain,
however. One interesting and currently controversial problem is what
amount should be included in the insured's gross estate if he gives away a
policy within three years of his death but the assignee, not the insured, pays
the post-assignment premiums that become due. 5 The 1976 Act did not
address this matter, and it generally has been neglected by tax commen-
tators. This Article will explore that issue, along with others arising from the
assignment of life insurance, and suggest some solutions. Before the tax
treatment of the assignment of life insurance can be analyzed, the economic
components of a life insurance policy need to be identified with some
precision.
I. LIFE INSURANCE AND ITS ECONOMIC COMPONENTS
The basic element of life insurance is risk coverage-coverage against
the risk that the insured will die during a stated period. Life insurance is
designed to provide compensation for the financial loss that the beneficiaries
of a policy would otherwise suffer as a consequence of the insured's death
prior to the expiration of his or her life expectancy. The cost of this risk
coverage (the pure insurance cost of the policy) is determined roughly in the
manner indicated by the following example. John Jones of x age and in good
health wishes to acquire $1,000 of life insurance for a one-year period. The
insurance company's actuarial tables indicate that 1% of persons of x age
will die during that year. Thus, a premium charge of approximately 1%
($10) will cover the risk of death for that year. In addition, the company has
management and selling expenses which will be passed on to the policyhold-
ers, and so Jones's premium will be somewhat greater than $10. If the
insurer is a profit-making stock company, the premium may include an
allowance for the company's profit. If the insurer is instead a mutual
company, 6 the company will charge a larger premium than it reasonably
expects -to need and at the end of each year will return the excess amount
over its actual needs to the policyholders as a so-called "dividend." 7
Policies which pay such "dividends" are called "participating insurance."
While participating insurance is commonly offered by mutual companies, it
is also offered by some stock companies.
The purchase of pure insurance coverage for a stated term is called
5. See, e.g.,, Estate of Silverman v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1975). See also
text accompanying notes 98-122 infra, where this issue is examined.
6. A mutual company has no stockholders and passes its earnings on to its policyholders
and to certain beneficiaries of matured policies.
7. See note 17 infra.
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"term insurance." In the case of Mr. Jones, the annual premium of his
$1,000 one year term policy was $10 plus. If Jones should wish to continue
that coverage for an additional year, the premium cost will be higher, since
the percentage of persons x+ 1 years of age who will die during the year is
greater than the percentage of persons only x years of age who will die
during the year. Thus, each year the premium cost of the term insurance will
increase. Term insurance typically is purchased for a specific term such as
five years, with an automatic right of the owner to renew at the end of each
term; the premium cost of the insurance, however, will increase as the
insured ages. If the insured attains an advanced age, the size of the premium
will become prohibitively high.
If Jones wishes to have insurance for a period in excess of one year but
seeks to avoid this steady increase in the annual premium, he can purchase
life insurance for a term consisting of a substantial number of years and pay
the same amount of premium each year for a decreasing amount of insur-
ance. The annual premium payments will therefore remain constant, but
every few years the amount of insurance coverage will be reduced. This
variation of term insurance is called "declining term life insurance."
A second type of life insurance is ordinary life, frequently called
"straight life" or "whole life," insurance. Ordinary life insurance
combines the purchase of pure risk coverage with an investment. Part of the
premium is charged to the pure insurance coverage of the policy (including
the company's expenses) and part of the premium is treated as an investment
by the policyholder with the insurer; this investment is referred to as the
policyholder's "reserve" (or "terminal reserve") in the policy. The reserve
is an equity interest of the policyholder, and typically it appreciates in value
each year at a fixed rate of increase established in the insurance contract. s
In the first few years of an ordinary life policy, the policyholder obtains
little or no reserve in the policy because most of the early premiums are used
to pay the company's expenses, including selling commissions. After this
initial period, the reserve increases each year, both because of appreciation
in the established reserve and because of the policyholder's payment of
additional premiums. Since the amount payable at death typically is a fixed
dollar figure, the amount of insurance risk coverage purchased by the
policyholder is the difference between the amount payable at death and the
policyholder's reserve. Since the reserve, representing the policyholder's
8. A variation of ordinary life is "variable life insurance." It is similar to ordinary life
insurance, except that it may not guarantee a specified return. The policyholder's reserve and
the death benefit may therefore vary from year to year according to the relative success or
failure of the insurer's investment program; a guaranteed minimum death benefit is, however,
frequently provided. Variable life insurance is a modern creation and has not yet become as
popular as ordinary life insurance.
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equity, increases each year, the policyholder actually purchases less insur-
ance each year, resulting in premiums which remain at a constant level. In
effect, the policyholder has combined an investment program providing a
secure but relatively low rate of return with declining term life insurance
coverage.
A policyholder may borrow from the insurer against his reserve or he
can surrender the policy for its cash value. Because of administrative costs,
the amount that can be realized by surrendering the policy or by borrowing
on it is slightly less than the policyholder's reserve. The amount realizable
on a surrender of the policy is called the "cash surrender value"; this value
at a given date typically can be determined from tables included in the policy
itself. After approximately five years from the date a policy is taken out, the
cash surrender value usually will be only slightly less than the policyhold-
er's reserve and can be used as an approximation of the reserve for planning
purposes. Upon request, the insurer will provide the policyholder with a
statement of the current value of the reserve.
On the death of the insured, the proceeds of the policy are payable
according to the method of settlement elected by the owner of the policy or
by the beneficiary. The various methods available for settling the proceeds
of a matured life insurance policy are referred to as "settlement options."
These settlement options, typically selected by the beneficiary after the
insured's death, permit an election either to have the insurance proceeds
paid to the beneficiary in one lump sum or to have the insurance company
retain the proceeds and pay it out under one of a variety of plans. 9 From the
above description of the types of life insurance policies available and their
various features, three economic components of life insurance emerge: (1)
the term insurance coverage component (coverage against the risk of the
insured's death within the period covered by the last premium paid); (2) the
9. Some of the most common options are:
(a) Interest only or deposit option-interest is paid currently to the beneficiary,
who is empowered to change to some other settlement option (including a lump sum
payment); some policies require the beneficiary to make such a change of election
within some stated period of time after the insured's death, but most policies permit
the change of election to be made at any time. The purpose of the deposit option is to
provide interest on proceeds left with the insurer while the beneficiary decides which
settlement to elect.(b) Fixed period option-the proceeds are paid out in installments of no less than
a specified amount over a fixed period of time, and if the policy earns more than a
minimum guaranteed interest for any installment period, the amount of installment
payment made to the beneficiary for that period will be increased accordingly.
(c) Fixed amount option-the proceeds are payable in a specified minimum
number of installments of a fixed amount; if the policy earns more than the guaranteed
minimum income, the number of payments is increased but the amount of each
installment payment remains constant.
(d) Straight life annuity-a periodic payment of a fixed dollar amount to be
made during the life of the beneficiary. Recently, some life insurance companies have
offered a variation of the straight life annuity called the "variable life annuity," under
which the periodic payments will vary in amount according to the success of the
company's investments.
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right of continuation component (the right to continue having insurance
coverage at a fixed price, regardless of the insured's health, beyond the
period covered by the last premium); and (3) the equity of terminal reserve
component. Of course, not all life insurance policies are comprised of all
three components. Nevertheless, it is important to keep these components in
mind for they will be crucial to the analysis that will be developed concern-
ing the proper tax treatment of assignments of life insurance policies. To set
the stage for this analysis, a description of the general framework of the
taxation of life insurance should first be set forth.
II. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE
A. Income Taxation of Life Insurance.
1. Exclusion of Proceeds from Gross Income. In general, section
101 of the Internal Revenue Code excludes life insurance proceeds from the
beneficiary's gross income.10 When the proceeds are payable in one lump
sum, the exclusion provided by section 101 is straightforward. When,
however, the beneficiary or the owner of the policy selects one of the other
settlement options that provides for the retention of the proceeds by the
insurer, the operation of the exclusion becomes somewhat complicated. Of
(e) Self and survivor annuity-an annuity of a specified amount paid periodical-
ly for the life of the primary beneficiary and on his or her death, survived by a named
secondary beneficiary, an annuity of a specified amount (which may be smaller than
the primary beneficiary's annuity) will be paid to the secondary beneficiary for life.(f) Joint and survivor annuity-an annuity for the joint lives of two beneficiaries
and for the life of the survivor. (The term "joint and survivor annuity" is sometimes
used to describe a self and survivor annuity option.)(g) Annuity with a refund or guaranteed payment-a refund feature of an annui-
ty provides that if less than a specified amount has been paid to the beneficiary or
beneficiaries at the time of the death of the last annuitant, the difference is payable in
one lump sum to some named person or persons. Another variation of this is an
annuity option with a guaranteed payment feature which provides that payments will
be made for no less than a specified period of time, regardless of when the ben-
eficiaries die.
Although settlement options are not as flexible a vehicle as a trust, they are not entirely
inflexible. For example, a fixed period option may provide for installment payments for part of
the option period larger than other payments, although the size of the payments typically must
be fixed at the time that the election is made.
10. One important exception to the general rule of excluding lump sum insurance payments
from gross income is the "transferee for value" rule. If the person owning a life insurance
policy on the death of the insured had acquired it for valuable consideration from someone
other than the insurer, the amount of proceeds excluded from gross income is limited to the
consideration and premiums paid by such person. I.R.C. § 101(a)(2). This rule does not apply to
a person who initially purchased the policy from the insurer; nor does it apply to a transferee of
a policy who received it without consideration, provided that the transferor was not himself a
transferee for value (or himself a transferee of a transferee for value). See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.101-
l(b)(3)(iii), 1.101-1(b)(5) Ex. (4) (1957). Even if a transferee acquired the policy for valuable
consideration, the transferee for value rule is not applicable if the transferee were the insured, a
partner of the insured, a partnership in which the insured is a partner or a corporation in which
the insured is a shareholder or officer. See I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(B).
LIFE INSURANCE
course, interest paid to a beneficiary on proceeds held by the insurer is
included in the beneficiary's gross income.11 In the case of installment
payments made to a beneficiary,12 the interest element of the payment is
included in the beneficiary's gross income; the portion of the installment
payment which is characterized as principal, however, is excluded. I3 Typi-
cally, the "principal" portion of an installment payment is a percentage of
the face amount of the insurance. The same proportion of each installment
payment is excluded irrespective of whether the aggregate of the prior
payments of principal exceeds the face amount of the insurance. 14 Moreov-
er, when life insurance proceeds are payable in installments to a surviving
spouse of the insured, section 101(d)(1)(B) excludes up to $1,000 of the
interest portion of such installments paid in a taxable year from the gross
income of the surviving spouse. This exclusion does not apply, however, to
interest paid on a deposit or "interest only"1 5 option.16
2. Appreciation in Reserve. A policyholder's reserve or equity
interest in an ordinary life insurance policy appreciates each year. To the
extent that this appreciation is not attributable to the policyholder's payment
of additional premiums, it constitutes "earnings" from the policyholder's
investment; these "earnings," however, are not taxed to the policyholder. 17
11. See I.R.C. § 101(c).
12. Typically, such payments are made under an annuity, fixed amount or fixed period
option. See note 9 supra.
13. I.R.C. §§ 101(d)(1), (d)(1)(A).
14. This occurs where a beneficiary of an annuity option outlives his life expectancy.
15. See note 9 supra.
16. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.101-3, 1.101-4(h) (1960), T.D. 6577, 1961-2 C.B. 17, 18-19.
17. Note that if a policyholder owns a participating life insurance policy, the so-called
"dividend" paid by the insurer to the policyholder each year is in fact a return of part of the
premiums previously paid by the policyholder, and so such "dividends" are not included in the
policyholder's gross income. See I J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.08
(rev. ed. 1974) (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.72-11(b) (1960)); cf. Rev. Rul. 64-258, 1964-2 C.B. 134
(holding that such payments do not constitute an inurement of net earnings to the policyholders
so that a tax-exempt organization's distribution to its members of the "dividends" it received
on policies insuring the life of its members did not disqualify the organization of its tax-exempt
status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(10)). Even "dividends" remitted on paid-up policies-policies for
which no further premium payments are due---are excluded from gross income because such
dividends are in essence a reduction of premiums paid in prior years. See 1 J. MERTENS, supra,
§ 7.08, at 18 n.35. If, however, the policyholder does not withdraw the dividends from the
insurance company but instead leaves them on deposit with the insurer to earn interest, the
interest credited to the accumulated dividends is included in the poiicyholder's gross income-
such interest is no different from interest credited to a savings account deposit. Id.
Note also that if a policyholder sells his insurance policy to a third party, he will recognize a
gain on the sale only if the amount he realized thereon exceeds his basis in the policy. Since all
of the premiums previously paid by the policyholder (less the "dividends" he received) are
included in his basis, the amount realized usually will not exceed the seller's basis. The reason
that the amount realized on a surrender of the policy often will be less than the policyholder's
basis is that the policyholder is permitted to include in his basis the portion of his premiums that
Vol. 1977:941]
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The rationale given for not taxing such appreciation to the policyholder is
that the income has not been "realized," or even "constructively re-
ceived," in the tax sense.18 Moreover, even though the face amount of the
proceeds payable to the beneficiary upon the death of the insured includes
this appreciation in the value of the policyholder's equity, such proceeds
generally are excluded from the gross income of the beneficiary by section
101.19
B. Estate Taxation of Life Insurance.
In determining how life insurance should be treated for transfer tax
purposes, one should keep in mind that the proper'and widely accepted view
of life insurance is that upon the death of the insured, the policyholder's
equity interest in the policy passes to the named beneficiaries along with a
payment by the insurer of an amount representing the proceeds of the risk
coverage element of the policy. 20 Thus, the payment that the beneficiaries
receive of the face amount of a policy is comprised of two separate ele-
ments: the equity interest of the policyholder and a death benefit payment.
This view of insurance conforms with the actuarial justification for the size
of premiums charged for a policy which is that the premiums are sufficient
only to purchase risk coverage for the difference between the face amount of
the policy and the policyholder's equity therein.
When the proceeds of a life insurance policy are received by the
insured's executor, section 2042(1) of the Code mandates that they be
included in the gross estate of the insured. This explicit inclusion of life
insurance proceeds payable to the insured's executor, while not free of
ambiguity, has not been especially troublesome to apply. In general, the
reference to the insured's "executor" means payable to or on behalf of the
insured's estate. 21
Where the named beneficiary of an insurance policy is someone other
than the insured's executor, section 2042(2) requires the insurance proceeds
to be included in the insured's gross estate if he possessed, at his death, any
"incidents of ownership" in the policy. While the Code makes no attempt
to define "incidents of ownership," the regulations make it clear that the
term is not limited to actual dominion over the policy, but also includes a
was attributable to the purchase of the insurance coverage for a specified period; the
policyholder's basis is not limited to the portion of the premium that constituted the policyhold-
er's addition to his reserve.
18. See Theodore H. Cohen, 39 T.C. 1055, 1062-64 (1963).
19. It should be noted, however, that I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)-the "transferee for value"
provision discussed at note 10 supra-is an exception to this rule.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 59 (1958); Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States, 430 F.2d 392, 395-96 (6th Cir. 1970).
21. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b) (1960).
[Vol. 1977:941
LIFE INSURANCE
lesser economic interest or benefit, such as the right to surrender or cancel
the policy, change the named beneficiary, or pledge the policy for a loan.22
An alternative approach to inclusion in cases where someone other
than the insured's executor is the beneficiary was employed prior to the
adoption of the 1954 Code.23 During the twelve-year period ending with the
adoption of the 1954 Code, in cases where the insured owned no incidents of
ownership in the policy at the time of his death, a fraction of the proceeds
(equal to the proportion of premiums paid by the insured to all premiums
paid on the policy) was included.24 In adopting the 1954 Code, Congress
eliminated this premium payment test in order to treat life insurance on a par
with other property. The House Ways and Means Committee reasoned that
"[n]o other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent initially
purchased it and then long before his death gave away all .rights to the
property" and to discriminate against life insurance in this regard was not
justified.25 The legislature's action, however, was sharply criticized by
some congressmen26 and tax commentators. 27 The merits of the premium
payment test will be discussed later in this Article, 28 and we shall demon-
strate that there is no justifiable policy for adopting that rule. The premium
payment test is particularly significant because the Tax Court's treatment
(for estate tax purposes) of life insurance proceeds where the insured had
assigned the policy within three years of his death and where the assignee
paid the premiums thereafter may well have been derived from a residual
adherence to the premium payment rationale.
C. Gift Taxation of Life Insurance.
There is no statutory gift tax provision expressly dealing with the
transfer of a life insurance policy or the payment of its premiums, and so
such transfers are dealt with under the general gift tax provisions applicable
to all types of transfers. 29 The regulations do provide that if the insured
22. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958). The term also includes "a reversionary interest in
the policy or its proceeds, whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other
instrument or by operation of law, but only if the value of the reversionary interest . . .
exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(3) (1958).
23. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(g)(2), 53 Stat. 1, 122, as amended by Revenue Act
of 1942, § 404, 56 Stat. 798, 944.
24. Id.
25. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954), reprinted in [19541 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4118.
26. See id. B14, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4608 (minority
views).
27. See, e.g., C.LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
§ 13.4 (3rd ed. 1974); 4 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE
TAXATION § 61.04(3) (rev. perm. ed. 1977).
28. See text accompanying notes 105-07 infra.
29. See I.R.C. 99 2511-2512.
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irrevocably assigns an insurance policy to another, "[t]he insured has made
a gift of the value of the policy" to the extent that the assignment exceeds
the value of any consideration received by the insured. 30
The gift tax value of a gift of a life insurance policy is its replacement
cost-the amount necessary to purchase a comparable policy from a
company regularly engaged in the selling of insurance. 31 The value of an
insurance policy may not be readily ascertainable, such as when the gift is a
policy that has been in effect for some time and upon which further
premiums must be paid. In that event the value of the gift is obtained by
combining the amount of the terminal reserve of the policy at the date of the
gift and the proportionate part of the last premium paid before the date of the
gift which covers the period extending beyond that date. 32 If the donor
continues to pay premiums after making a gift of the life insurance policy,
he is deemed to have made an additional gift to the extent of each premium
paid. 33
1. Annual Exclusion. Note, however, that all or a portion of a gift
of a life insurance policy may be excluded from gift tax. Section 2503(b) of
the Code provides that a donor is entitled to an annual exclusion of $3,000
for gifts, other than gifts of "future interests," 34 given to each donee. An
outright gift of an insurance policy (as contrasted to a gift in trust) is treated
as a gift of a present interest, even though the proceeds will not be collected
until a future date. 35 The annual exclusion can also apply to premium
30. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8) (1958). No reason exists for limiting the tax to transfers
made by the insured; a gift tax will be imposed on any donor of a life insurance policy, unless a
section of the Code expressly provides otherwise.
31. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a) (1958).
32. Id. The following example is given by the regulations:
Example (4). A gift is made four months after the last premium due date of an
ordinary life insurance policy issued nine years and four months prior to the gift
thereof by the insured, who was 35 years of age at date of issue. The gross annual
premium is $2,811. The computation follows:
Terminal reserve at end of tenth year ................................................... $14,601.00
Terminal reserve at end of ninth year ................................................... 12,965 00
Increase ..................................................................................... $ 1,636.00
One-third of such increase (the gift having been made four months
following the last preceding premium due date), is ............................... $ 545.33
Terminal reserve at end of ninth year ................................................... 12,965 00
Interpolated terminal reserve at date of gift ........................................... 13,510 33
Two-thirds of gross premium ($2,811) .................................................. 1,874.00
Value of the gift ........................................................................... $15,384.33
33. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8) (1958).
34. The term "future interest" has its own definition under the gift tax provisions and does
not have the same meaning as it does under general property law. Any gift under which the
donee's possession, use or enjoyment is postponed is a gift of a future interest. See Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2503-3(a) (1958).
35. In Rev. Rul. 55-408, 1955-1 C.B. 113, the Commissioner repudiated a suggestion made
by the Tax Court in Nashville Trust Co., 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 992 (1943), that a gift of a policy
before it had built up any cash surrender value was a gift of a future interest. See also Treas.
Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (1958). It should be noted, however, that if the gift is subject to a limitation
(Vol. 1977:941
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payments made by the donor in subsequent years. 6 If a life insurance policy
is assigned to a trustee, however, the gift of the policy and any subsequent
premium paid by the donor likely will not qualify for the annual exclusion.
37
2. Importance of Qualifying for the Annual Exclusion. The qualifi-
cation of gifts of insurance policies and premium payments for the annual
exclusion took on added importance as a consequence of the recent integra-
tion of estate and gift taxation by the Tax Reform Act of 1976.38 Congress
took several steps to accomplish this integration. First, it provided the same
tax rate schedule for all donative transfers (whether inter vivos or testamen-
tary) made after 1976. 39 Second, Congress provided that the "adjusted
taxable gifts" made by a decedent are to be included in the decedent's estate
tax base on his death, and that the estate tax payable on the estate tax base is
to be reduced by any gift taxes paid or payable with respect to gifts made by
the decedent after 1976. This means, in effect, that while the adjusted
taxable gifts previously made by a decedent are not subject to an additional
tax upon his death, n' such gifts do increase the rate of tax applicable to the
decedent's taxable estate so that the amount of tax payable thereon will
equal the amount that would have been payable at his death if the decedent
had also owned at his death property having a value equal to his adjusted
taxable gifts.
The "adjusted taxable gifts" of a decedent are the aggregate of the
taxable gifts of the decedent which were made after 1976, other than gifts
which are includable in the decedent's gross estate. 41 Since the amount of a
which restricts the donee's right to reassign the policy, obtain its cash surrender value or
borrow against its terminal reserve, then the donated property constitutes a future interest, and
no annual exclusion can be claimed. See Ryerson v. United States, 312 U.S. 405,408-09 (1941);
Skouras v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1951); John M. Smyth, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 4
(1943).
36. See Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300; Rev. Rul. 55-408, 1955-1 C.B. 113.
37. See note 53 infra. If the donor is married and his spouse consents to split the donor's
gifts between them under section 2513, the $3,000 available annual exclusion for the donor's
gifts to a third party (someone other than the donor's spouse) may be doubled to $6,000. If a gift
is made to the donor's spouse, only $3,000 can be excluded, but the balance of the gift may
qualify for a marital deduction. The amount of gifts to a spouse which can qualify for a marital
deduction was liberalized by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. In general, a deduction was allowed
for one-half of the qualified gifts made to a spouse prior to 1977. After 1976, the first $100,000
of value of qualified taxable gifts is deductible; the next $100,000 of value of such gifts is not
deductible; and one-half of the amount of qualified gifts in excess of $200,000 is deductible.
I.R.C. § 2523(a)(2).
38. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356.
39. I.R.C. §§ 2001(c), 2502(a).
40. The offsetting of gift taxes previously paid or payable against the current estate tax
effectively insulates the adjusted taxable gifts from the imposition of a second transfer tax,
even though (in form) an estate tax is payable thereon.
41. I.R.C. § 2001(b).
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gift that is excluded under the annual exclusion allowance is not included in
the donor's taxable gifts, the availability of the exclusion is extremely
important in that the amount so excluded will not be added to the decedent's
estate tax base and so will not increase the estate tax rates applicable to the
decedent's taxable estate. 42 Of course, if the donated property is included in
the decedent's gross estate (because, for example, of a retained interest or
power of the decedent), 43 the qualification of the gift for the annual exclu-
sion is far less important.
Prior to 1977, the proceeds of a life insurance policy assigned to
another by the insured within three years of his death might have been
included in the insured's gross estate as having been made in contemplation
of death. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, as was noted above, replaced the
subjective contemplation of death rule with a rule of automatic inclusion of
all gifts made within three years of death. 44 The new law also provides,
however, that "any gift excludable in computing taxable gifts by reason of
section 2503(b)" (that is, by virtue of the annual exclusion) is also exempt
from section 2035's inclusion in the donor's gross estate. 45 An important
question is whether property which was worth less than $3,000 when the
decedent made the gift, but which substantially appreciated in value in the
interval between such transfer and the decedent's death, is fully excludable
from the decedent's gross estate under section 2035(b)(2), or whether it is
excludable only to the extent of the dollar amount that was excluded from
the gift tax when the gift was made. Under the former view, if an insured
assigns to a third party all incidents of ownership in a $100,000 (face value)
life insurance policy prior to the accumulation of a terminal reserve in
excess of $3,000, and he dies within three years of making the gratuitous
assignment, not only will he pay no gift tax, but the policy's proceeds will
be excluded from his gross estate.4 6 The literal language of section
2035(b)(2) suggests that the entire $100,000 proceeds are excludable from
the insured's gross estate, since the exclusion of a "gift" normally refers to
the property which was donated and not merely to the value of such property
at the time of the gift. Several tax commentaries have reported a rumor that
42. A gift to the decedent's spouse will not constitute an adjusted taxable gift to the extent
that it qualifies for a marital deduction. However, such gifts which qualify for the marital
deduction may have an adverseestate tax consequence in that they will cause a reduction in the
maximum limitation on the estate tax marital deduction if the aggregate of such gifts at the time
of the decedent's death is less than $200,000. Id. § 2056(c)(1)(B).
43. See id. §§ 2036, 2038.
44. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(5), 90 Stat. 1520, 1848 (codified
at I.R.C. § 2035). See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
45. I.R.C. § 2035(b)(2).
46. See Ditz, Life Insurance Can Solve Many Dilemmas of Estate and Gift Planning Under
New Rules, 4 EST. PLAN. 130, 130-31 (1977); Congress Prepares to Reopen Loopholes as Well as
Close Them in Its Tax Measure, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1977, at 38, col. 1; 111-3d TAX MNGM'T
(BNA) A-21 (Changes & Additions 1977).
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the Service will adopt the alternate interpretation of section 2035(b)(2), and
thus, in our example, would include a little less than $100,000 in the
insured's gross estate (that is $100,000 less the value of the policy at the
date the insured gave it away). 47 Regardless of the ultimate construction of
the current statutory language, it is likely that Congress will resolve the
matter by statutory amendment. 48 Indeed, on April 28, 1977, Congressman
Ullman introduced a bill which would limit the exclusion from section 2035
to the entire amount of property given to a donee who did not receive a
taxable gift from the donor within that year, but the bill would preclude a
transfer "with respect to a life insurance policy" from being so excluded
from section 2035. 49 This bill was passed by the House on October 17,
1977,50 and is currently pending before the Senate. If this bill is adopted, the
qualification of an insured's assignment of a life insurance policy for an
annual exclusion will continue to reduce the size of his estate tax base if the
"gift" is not included in his gross estate (that is, the exclusion will reduce
the amount of his adjusted taxable gifts); but the exclusion will have no
estate tax consequence if the insured dies within three years of making the
assignment so that section 2035 is applicable. However, if after assigning a
policy insuring his life, the insured continues to pay the premiums for the
policy (and thereby makes additional gifts), the availability of the gift tax
annual exclusion for such payments may have estate tax significance as
well. The House Report on the bill51 states that the bill's prohibition against
excluding from section 2035 transfers "with respect to a life insurance
policy" does not apply to the payment of premiums but only to a transfer of
the policy itself.52
47. See 46 J. TAX. 255 (Apr. 1977); 111-3d TAX MNGM'T (BNA) A-21, supra note 46. See
also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976,
94TH CONG., 2D SESS. 529 (1976).
48. See Congress Prepares to Reopen Loopholes as Well as Close Them in Its Tax Measure,
supra note 46.
49. H.R. 6715, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(f) (1977). The Treasury Department's recom-
mendations on H.R. 6715 deal with the "within three years of death" in a simple, direct and
reasonable fashion. See Statement of Donald C. Lubick, Deputy Assist. Sec. of Treas., to
House Ways and Means Committee (Sept. 8, 1977), reprinted in DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No.
175, at J-10 (Sept. 8, 1977). The Treasury Department recommends that section 2035(a) and (b)
be repealed and that section 2035(c), which deals with the grossing up of gift taxes paid within
three years of death, be retained and redesignated as section 2035(a). Sections 2036 and 2042
(life insurance) would be amended by adding a three-year rule to those provisions. If Congress
adopts these changes, it should be alert to the fact that the operation of a number of other code
provisions turns on the proportion of certain assets to the value of a decedent's gross estate.
The integrity of those provisions should be protected. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 303, 2032A, 6166,
6166A.
50. 123 CONG. REC. HI1,112 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1977).
51. H.R. REP. No. 700, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1977).
52. In the discussion above, no attention was given to the effect of a beneficiary's payment
of premiums between the date on which the policy was assigned and the date of the insured's
death. The major purpose of this Article is to examine the tax effect of such premium
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Since qualification for the annual exclusion will, in many cases, be
extremely significant to the tax consequences of making a gift of an insur-
ance policy, it may be critical to qualify a gift of a policy and subsequent
premium payments thereon as gifts of a present interest. In general, a gift in
trust of a life insurance policy (and premium payments made thereafter by
the insured) will be treated as a gift of a future interest.53 Even where the
beneficiary of the trtst is given an immediate right to trust income, a gift to
the trust of a life insurance policy is a gift of non-income-producing
property, and thus ordinarily is treated as a gift of a future interest. 54 If,
however, the income beneficiary has the power to demand conversion of
trust principal into income-producing assets, the gift of the income interest
in the value of the policy may qualify as a present interest and, thus, be
eligible for the annual exclusion.55 Also, if the beneficiary of the trust can
demand payment of the trust estate at any time, the property transferred to
the trust will qualify as the gift of a present interest. 56
Ill. ASSIGNMENT OF OWNERSHIP MORE THAN THREE YEARS
PRIOR TO THE INSURED'S DEATH
If, more than three years before his death, an insured assigns to another
(whether the assignment is made outright or in trust) all incidents of
ownership in a life insurance policy, the proceeds of the policy will not be
included in the insured's gross estate, provided that he does not retain or
subsequently acquire (directly or indirectly) any incident of ownership.
Section 2035 does not apply since, on its terms, that provision covers only
transfers made within three years of the transferor's death. The assignment,
of course, is subject to the gift tax, and the value of the policy at the time of
the assignment (less any annual exclusion that was allowed) is included in
the insured's estate tax base as an "adjusted taxable gift," 57 except to the
payments, and that issue is discussed later in this piece. See text accompanying notes 97-122
infra.
53. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(c), Ex. 2 (1958). But cf. Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B.
300 (a gift in trust of a group term life insurance policy was held to have no ascertainable value,
therefore, no taxable gift occurred; subsequent premium payments which were attributed to the
insured were deemed eligible for the annual exclusion). See also Ryerson v. Jnited States, 312
U.S. 405 (1941); Jesse S. Phillips, 12 T.C. 216 (1949).
54. See Rev. Rul. 69-344, 1969-1 C.B. 225.
55. See Rosen v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1968). Cf. Treas. Reg. §§
20.2056(b)-5(f)(4), 25.2523(e)-l(f)(4) (1958) (in order for a trust to qualify for an estate or gift tax
marital deduction, the principal must either be funded with income-producing assets or the
beneficiary must have the power to convert the nonproductive assets).
56. Harbeck Halsted, 28 T.C. 1069, 1074 (1957), acq., 1958-1 C.B. 5; cf. Gilmore v.
Commissioner, 213 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1954) (gift of corporate stock in trust, to be transferred to
minor beneficiaries upon demand, qualified for annual exclusion even though trustees were
authorized to invest in non-income producing investments).
57. I.R.C. § 2001(b).
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extefit that the assignment qualified for the gift tax marital or charitable
deduction.
If the assignment was not made to the insured's spouse, and the insured
and his spouse elected to split the gift under section 2513, then only the
insured's one-half share (less his annual exclusion, if any) is included in the
insured's adjusted taxable gifts. The other one-half share of the gift (less any
annual exclusion allowed to the non-donor spouse) will be included in the
estate tax base of the non-donor spouse on her death.
The question of whether an insured possessed an incident of ownership
in a policy at his death can raise difficult issues which are beyond the scope
of this Article. One current area of controversy concerns the question of
whether an insured's possession of control over a policy in a purely
fiduciary capacity constitutes an incident of ownership for purposes of
section 2042.58 This Article, however, focuses on the consequences where
the insured parted with all incidents of ownership prior to his demise.
A. Payment of Premiums by the Insured.
If, after assigning ownership of a policy to another, the insured
continues to pay the premiums for the policy, those payments may cause
transfer tax consequences. The amounts paid which are not excluded by the
annual exclusion will be subject to the gift tax, but, in appropriate cases, the
donor will qualify for a gift tax marital or charitable deduction for all or part
of such payments. To the extent that the premium payments qualify for the
gift tax marital deduction, however, they may lower the ceiling on the
amount deductible under the estate tax marital deduction on the donor's
death.59
Any premium payments made more than three years prior to the
insured's death are included in his estate tax base as "adjusted taxable
gifts" to the extent that such payments were not excluded by the annual
exclusion or deductible as marital or charitable deductions. 6° Premium
payments made by the insured within three years of his death do not
58. See note 2 supra. This issue often arises where one spouse owns a policy insuring the
life of the other spouse and the policyholder dies first, bequeathing the policy in trust, and
naming the insured spouse as one of the trustees. On the subsequent death of the insured
spouse, the proceeds may be included in his gross estate if his fiduciary powers constitute an
incident of ownership. The courts are divided on the issue of which fiduciary powers will cause
inclusion of the proceeds. The Commissioner has ruled that when the proceeds are so included
in the insured's spouse's gross estate, due to the incidents of ownership held as trustee, no
credit will be allowed under section 2013 for the estate tax paid by the non-insured spouse's
estate on the value of the policy at the non-insured spouse's death. Rev. Rul. 77-156, 1977-1
C.B. 269.
59. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(I)(B).
60. If split gift treatment under section 2513 was elected for such payments, the portion of
the payments attributable to the insured's spouse is excluded from the insured's estate tax base.
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constitute adjusted taxable gifts, since such payments either will be included
in his gross estate under section 2035 or will be excluded under section
2035(b)(2). 61 The question of the amount includable under section 2035
because of premium payments made by the insured within three years of his
death, once a controversial issue, has been settled for some years now. The
nature of this controversy and its ultimate resolution, though, are worthy of
note.
B. The Constructive Transfer Principle and its Proper Limits.
In 1967, the Commissioner issued a Revenue Ruling which adopted the
position that a premium payment constituted a transfer of an interest in the
policy, and that the interest would be measured by the proportion that the
amount of the premium bore to the total amount of premiums that had been
paid by the time of the insured's death. 62 Accordingly, on an insured's
death, the Commissioner sought to include in the insured's gross estate that
proportion of the insurance proceeds equal to the ratio that the amount of
premiums paid by the insured within three years of his death bore to the
aggregate amount of premiums paid on the policy by the time of his death. 63
To support his argument, the Commissioner relied on certain language
in the 1929 decision of the Supreme Court in Chase National Bank v.
United States .6 In Chase, the insured had purchased life insurance, re-
tained incidents of ownership and named his wife as beneficiary. The
insured, who died within two years of procuring the insurance, had paid all
premiums due on the policies. The insured's estate challenged the constitu-
tionality of the statute (the antecedent of section 2042(2)) which subjected
the insurance proceeds to estate taxation. The estate contended that the tax
was one on property itself (and therefore an unconstitutional unapportioned
direct tax) rather than a tax on a "transfer" of property. This was so, the
argument went, because the insured had never transferred the proceeds to
the beneficiary; rather, the beneficiary had acquired the proceeds directly
from the insurer. 65 In upholding the validity of the tax, the Supreme Court
held that in substance the insurance proceeds had been transferred by the
insured to the beneficiary, since his instruction to the insurer to pay the
61. If the premium payments made by the insured within three years of his death are
treated as split gifts by the insured and his spouse, the portion allocated to the spouse (including
the amount thereof that qualified for an annual exclusion) nevertheless will be captured in the
insured's gross estate by section 2035.
62. Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 C.B. 327.
63. Id. The position adopted by the Commissioner in 1967 applied only to premium
payments made in contemplation of death. Because of the 1976 Act's substitution of an
automatic inclusion rule for the contemplation of death test, this Article omits from the
discussion of section 2035 any reference to the subjective motive of the donor.
64. 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
65. Id. at 334.
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proceeds to his wife constituted a procurement of the proceeds by him for
delivery to his wife. The Court determined that a person who purchases
property from another to be delivered to a third party is to be treated as
having transferred that property to the third party, and indicated that this
principle would apply in interpreting the word "'transfer" in the Code as
well as in deciding the constitutionality of a particular provision. 66
The courts, however, uniformly rejected the Commissioner's reliance
on the Chase holding in the situation under discussion. 67 In so doing, they
did not repudiate the Supreme Court's construction of the meaning of
"transfer," but rather deemed that construction not to be determinative of
the problem at hand. The clearest statement of the rationale for rejecting the
Commissioner's position 68 was given by the Fifth Circuit in First National
Bank of Midland v. United States:69
The actual essence of the Government's position is that it wishes
to place a decedent who pays the premiums on a policy owned by
another on the same footing with one who physically transfers the
policy itself. It is said that the. . .[policyholders] received insurance
benefits and not cash and that the payment of each and every premium
helped to produce the proceeds. The answer to this, however,. . . [is]
that the rights maintained belonged to the owners, not to the decedent,
and were thus neither transferred nor transferrable by the decedent. 7
Following these defeats in the courts, the Commissioner reconsidered his
position and issued Revenue Ruling 71-497, which revoked his 1967 ruling
and conceded that only the dollar amount of premiums paid by the insured
within three years of his death is included in his gross estate. 71 In Revenue
Ruling 71-497, the premiums were paid on both a whole life insurance
policy and on a term insurance policy.
66. Id. at 337-38.
67. See First Nat'l Bank of Midland v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1970);
Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 228-31 (E.D. Mich. 1968); Estate of Coleman, 52
T.C. 921, 923-24 (1969). See also Estate of Chapin, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 11, 15-16 (1970); Lowndes
& Stephens, Identification of Property Subject to the Federal Estate Tax, 65 MICH. L. REv. 105,
124-25 (1966); Note, Section 2035 as a Basis for Including Life Insurance Proceeds in the Gross
Estate of Insured Who Paid Premiums on a Policy OwnedBy AnotherPerson, 67 MICH. L. REV.
812 (1969).
68. Even if the Commissioner had prevailed in arguing that there was a constructive
transfer of a portion of the insurance proceeds, the portion includible should not have been
figured on the basis of the Commissioner's formula. The Commissioner's formula undoubtedly
was derived from the old payment of premiums test which Congress eliminated from section
2042 in 1954. The failings of the premium payment test are discussed later in this Article. See
text accompanying notes 105-10 infra.
69. 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970); accord, Bintliff v. United States, 462 F.2d 403 (5th Cir.
1972).
70. 423 F.2d at 1288.
71. Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 329, revoking Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 C.B. 327. Of
course, the amount of such premiums may be excluded from the insured's gross estate under
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Revenue Ruling 71-497 also considered the proper treatment of an
insured's purchase of an insurance policy for another within three years of
the insured's death. The situation described in the ruling was that nine
months before his death the insured purchased a one-year term accidental
death policy; his children were designated as the owners and beneficiaries of
that policy. Thus, while the insured paid the premium for the policy, at no
time did he possess an incident of ownership in the policy. The Commis-
sioner ruled that under section 2035 the entire proceeds of the accidental
death policy were includable in the insured's gross estate, not merely the
dollar amount of the premium for the policy. The crux of the Commission-
er's decision lay in his determination that the substance of the transaction
was that the insured had transferred ownership of the policy to his children
and had not merely paid a premium on a policy that they owned.72 The
Commissioner again relied on the Chase National Bank case, and this time
the Commissioner's position was sustained by the courts, coincidentally in a
decision of the Fifth Circuit, Bel v. United States.73
In Bel, the isured had each year purchased, with community funds, a
one-year term accidental death policy in the name of his three children. The
insured died within ten months of acquiring the last such policy. Referring
to the Chase National Bank opinion and relying on section 2035 rather than
section 2042, the Fifth Circuit treated the insured as having assigned the
policy itself to his children within three years of his death and accordingly
included half of the proceeds (the insured's community share) in his gross
estate. While explicitly recognizing that the insured never possessed any
incident of ownership, the court concluded
that section 2042 and the incidents-of-ownership test are totally irrelev-
ant to a proper application of section 2035. We think our focus should
be on the control beam of the word "transfer." The decedent, and the
decedent alone, beamed the accidental death policy at his children, for
by paying the premium he designated ownership of the policy and
created in his children all of the contractual rights to the insurance
benefits. These were acts of transfer. The policy was not procured and
ownership designated and designed by some goblin or hovering spirit.
Without. . . [the decedent's] conception, guidance, and payment, the
proceeds of the policy in the context of this case would not have been
the children's. His actions were not ethereally, spiritually, or occultly
actuated. Rather, they constituted worldly acts which by any other
name come out as a "transfer." Had the decedent, within three years
of his death, procured the policy in his own name and immediately
section 2035(b)(2) if the premium payments qualified for the annual exclusion, but it should be
borne in mind that it is likely that Congress will soon amend section 2035. See note 48 supra.
72. 1971-2 C.B. 330.
73. 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972).
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thereafter assigned all ownership rights to his children, there is no
question but that the policy proceeds would have been included in his
estate. In our opinion the decedent's mode of execution is functionally
indistinguishable. Therefore, we hold that the action of the decedent
constituted a "transfer" of the accidental death policy within the
meaning of section 2035, and that the district court erred in failing to
include. . . [the decedent's] community share of the proceed value of
the policy in his gross estate. 74
The courts (led by the Fifth Circuit in each instance) have, therefore,
rejected the use of the constructive transfer principle in the case of payments
of insurance premiums on policies owned by another, but accepted its use in
the case of original purchases of policies in the name of another. In each
case, however, the donor purchased something of his choosing from the
insurance company for the donee. From this standpoint, both cases are quite
different from a situation clearly outside the proper limits of the constructive
transfer principle, for example, where the donor gives cash to a donee to do
with it as the donee sees fit. It should be equally clear, moreover, that the
use of the constructive transfer principle is fully warranted in the case of an
original purchase of a policy for a donee. 75 Indeed, it would be difficult to
think of a case which would fall more clearly within the proper limits of that
principle. 76
74. 452 F.2d at 691-92.
75. Although both Revenue Ruling 71-497 and Bel concerned accidental death policies, the
principle of constructive transfer is of course applicable to the original purchase in the name of
a donee of other types of policies. The difficulty that purchasers of accidental death policies
have encountered may have been engendered by the fact that they purchased one-year term
policies (which is the customary period for such insurance), so that each annual premium is
really the acquisition of a new policy. If an insurer were to issue a five-year term accidental
death policy with premiums payable in five annual installments, it is problematic whether the
assignment of such a policy more than three years before the insured's death would avoid the
reach of section 2035 if the insured paid the premium installments. It is quite possible that each
installment would be treated as the purchase of a new policy. However, if the insured prepaid
the premiums for the entire five-year term and assigned the policy more than three years before
his death, the proceeds should not be included in his gross estate. An interesting question arises
if the following plan were adopted: the insured acquires a twenty-year term accidental death
policy with premiums payable in annual installments; he pre-pays three years' installments and
immediately assigns the policy to another; each year, he pre-pays the premium for the fourth
year hence. If he lives for more than three years after making the assignment, arguably the
proceeds should not be included under section 2035, since he both paid the premium for the
policy for the year of his death and assigned away the policy more than three years before his
death. The nature of the scheme is obvious, but an insured may have little to lose by trying it.
On the other hand, it is so unlikely that accidental death insurance will mature that it probably is
not worth embarking on a plan of this type, especially since the avoidance of estate taxes if the
policy does mature is uncertain. The simplest and most promising method of seeking to avoid
section 2035 is to have a beneficiary apply for and purchase the accidental death insurance
policy with the beneficiary's own funds, funds that were not given to him by the insured for the
purpose of purchasing the policy.
76. Other situations have recently been held to fall within the constructive transfer princi-
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Why then, does the situation where the insured pays premiums within
three years of his death on a policy owned by another not also fall within the
proper limits of the constructive transfer principle? Simply put, it is because
the item of property that the donor acquires for the donee when he purchases
an insurance policy for the donee, a situation where the constructive transfer
principle is applied, is one that he could have acquired for himself and then
given to the donee. But when an insured pays the premiums on a policy
already owned by the donee, the donor's premium payment purchases for
the donee items of property that the donor could not have acquired for
himself-an increase in the equity reserve in the policy owned by the donee
plus insurance coverage 77 for a certain period. Only the donee, the policy-
holder, could acquire these property interests because it is the donee, not the
insured, who then owns the right of continuation component of the policy.
In the words of the Fifth Circuit in First National Bank, they were not
"transferable by the decedent."
In sum, the constructive transfer principle enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Chase is properly limited, at least insofar as section 2035 is
concerned, to purchases in the name of the donee of property interests which
the donor could have acquired for himself. To demonstrate that this is so,
some exploration of the purpose and function of section 2035 is in order.
C. The Purpose and Function of Section 2035.
The purpose of section 2035 is to prevent estate tax avoidance by the
use of lifetime gifts as a substitute for testamentary gifts.78 The first step in
applying section 2035 is therefore the determination of what property
pie, and properly so. For example, where a decedent had his wife apply for term insurance on
the decedent's life and where the decedent paid the premiums thereon, the decedent was
deemed to have transferred the policy to his wife. First Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. United States,
488 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1973). Similarly, where a decedent created an irrevocable trust, directed
the trustee to acquire $100,000 of insurance on the decedent's life out of cash transferred to the
trust, and died within six months thereafter, the Sixth Circuit held that for purposes of section
2035 the decedent was deemed to have transferred the $100,000 policy to the trustee. Detroit
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929
(1973).
Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300 provides an interesting example of a constructive
transfer by the insured of premium payments. In that ruling, the insured had assigned to an
irrevocable trust all of his interest in a group term life insurance policy granted by the insured's
employer. The employer voluntarily continued to pay the premiums for the assigned policy.
The Commissioner ruled that each premium payment made by the employer was an indirect gift
from the insured to the assignee of the policy and was therefore subject to gift tax. Surprisingly,
however, the Commissioner ruled that each such gift was not a transfer of a future interest and
therefore qualified for the $3,000 annual exclusion.
77. As used herein, "insurance coverage" refers to the amount of difference between the
proceeds payable on the death of the insured and the policyholder's equity reserve in the policy.
78. See, e.g., Estate of Compton v. Commissioner, 532 F.2d 1086, 1087 (6th Cir. 1976); Bel
v. United States, 452 F.2d 683, 687 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972).
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interest was transferred by the decedent, thereafter including in the dece-
dent's gross estate the value of that interest determined as of the estate tax
valuation date79 (typically, the date of the decedent's death). The theory is
that the property's value at date of death would have been included in the
decedent's gross estate had he not made the inter vivos transfer. The
function of section 2035 is therefore to prevent the decedent from reducing
his estate tax base by transfers made shortly before his death. The 1976
Act's integration of estate and gift taxes reduces the significance of section
2035,80 but it remains important where the value of the donated property
appreciates substantially after the gift was made, as typically is the case with
life insurance where the insured dies shortly after the assignment. 81
Since the function of section 2035 is to prevent the decedent from
reducing his estate tax base by transfers made shortly before his death, that
section should include only property interests which potentially could have
been included in the decedent's estate tax base had he not made a transfer. It
is for this reason that the constructive transfer principle is properly limited to
property interests which the decedent could have acquired for himself. If the
decedent could not have acquired the property interest for himself, his
purchase of such an interest for another removes from his estate only the
dollar amount actually expended by him. There are, of course, few property
interests which a person can acquire for someone else but cannot acquire for
himself. The interest conferred on a policyholder when a donor pays pre-
miums on the policy is not the only one, however. Another arises where a
third party owns property on which a payment is due. A donor's gratuitous
payment of the debt constitutes a gift of the payment itself and does not
constitute a gift of a fraction of the property for which the debt was incurred.
Since the donor did not own the property, no fraction of the property could
have been included in his gross estate if he had not made a gift of the
payment; section 2035 should therefore reach only the payment itself, as
that is the only property which was removed from the decedent's estate by
the gift. So, if X owned real estate subject to a mortgage, Y's satisfaction of
a mortgage installment payment is a gift of the dollar amount expended. The
same rationale applies to the payment of life insurance premiums on a policy
79. I.R.C. §§ 2031(a), 2032(a).
80. The 1976 Act amended section 2035 to require the inclusion in the decedent's gross
estate of all gift taxes paid on gifts made by the decedent within three years of his death. This
provision applies only to gifts made after 1976.
81. Section 2035 is also of great importance in that it can operate in conjunction with other
Code sections to cause the inclusion in a decedent's gross estate of property whose value far
exceeds that of the interest or power transferred or released by the decedent within three years
of his death. For example, a grantor's transfer, shortly before his death, of a life income
interest in a trust that he had previously created, and in which he had retained such an interest,
will cause the value of the trust assets to be included in his gross estate under the combined
application of sections 2036 and 2035.
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owned by another. Since the insured did not own, and could not acquire, an
interest in the policy on which he paid premiums, no interest in the policy
could have been included in his gross estate had he not paid the premiums.
IV. ASSIGNMENT OF OWNERSHIP WITHIN THREE YEARS OF DEATH
If a donor were to make an outright gift of an item of property within
three years of his death, the value of the donated property will generally be
included in his gross estate, since that value would have been so included if
he had not made the transfer. This rule is equally applicable where periodic
payments must be made subsequently in order to retain the property. For
example, the donee of a parcel of real estate may be required to pay real
estate taxes and to make mortgage payments in order to prevent a tax sale or
a foreclosure. Notwithstanding that encumbrance, the value of the property
(less the value of the donee's improvements and contributions) will be
included in the donor's gross estate if he dies within three years. Even if the
donee failed to make the required payments and lost the realty in a tax or
foreclosure sale, the value of the donated realty itself (presumably reduced
by the amount of debt on the realty at the time of the gift) will be included in
the donor's gross estate. 82 Of course, if the donor had retained the property,
82. See Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 US.
817 (1947); Rev. Rul. 72-282, 1972-1 C.B. 306. See also Rev. Rul. 76-235, 1976-1 C.B. 277,
where property transferred within three years of death was valued under section 2035 at the
date of the donor's death, without reduction for a mortgage on the property taken out by the
donee to secure a loan that did not benefit the donor.
The Commissioner's determination to value the donated property itself (at least where the
gift was not made in trust) can create some peculiar consequences. For example, assume that a
donor purchases a ticket for the Irish Sweepstakes for $2, promptly giving the ticket to a donee.
Subsequently, a horse is designated for that ticket and its value is thereby increased to $5,000.
If the horse wins the race, the amount payable on the ticket is $100,000. The donee must decide
whether to sell the ticket for $5,000 or to hold the ticket and gamble on the horse's winning. If
the horse loses, the ticket will be worthless. The donee elects to sell for $5,000, and the race is
run before the donor's death. Should the amount included in the donor's gross estate be either
$100,000 or zero, depending upon whether the horse won? The position adopted by the
Commissioner (and the courts) would seem to compel that result, but the question of whether
the donor would have held onto the ticket is far more speculative than is the case with most
donated properties (for example, stocks, bonds and realty).
It has been suggested (but the issue is unsettled) that the rule which states that the donated
property itself is valued under section 2035 will not be applied by the Service to gifts made in
trust; rather, the res of the trust will be valued as it exists at the donor's death. But see In re
Kroger's Estate, 145 F.2d 901, 907-08 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 866 (1945). The
above suggestion has been criticized by several prominent commentators. See, e.g., C. LoWN-
DES, R. KRAMER & J. McCORD, supra note 27, at § 5.15; R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 4-72 (3d ed. 1974); Lowndes & Stephens, supra note 67,
at 139. These criticisms are grounded on an assumption that the principal reason for focusing on
the proceeds from the sale or exchange of donated property only if it was donated in trust is that
the Service believes that it is feasible to trace the proceeds where they are held in trust, but it
generally is not feasible to do so if they are not. The commentators have challenged that
premise. However, it is possible to justify this distinction on a quite different conceptual
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he might not have made the required payments; the statute, however,
operates on the implicit irrebuttable assumption that he would have done so.
This assumption is a practical necessity in order for section 2035 to
have meaningful significance. Any taxes paid by the donee should constitute
a contribution by him that reduces the amount included in the donor's gross
estate,8 3 but it is far from clear that such payments will be so treated. If the
donor had retained the property, his payment of such taxes would have
reduced his gross estate. Of course, he would have enjoyed an income tax
deduction therefor, so that the net reduction in his estate might have been
less than the tax payment; it would be administratively inconvenient, how-
ever, to attempt to compute the income tax savings the donor would have
enjoyed from such a deduction. s4 Any mortgage payments made by the
donee will constitute a contribution by him; such payments will increase the
owner's equity in the property and so must be treated as the donee's
contribution in order to prevent an over-valuation of the interest transferred
by the donor. Where, within three years of his death, an insured assigns to
another all incidents of ownership in a policy insuring his life, the amount
includible in the insured's gross estate, if any, depends upon whether
subsequent premiums become due, are paid and if so, by whom.
A. No Post-Assignment Premiums Become Due.
If no post-assignment premiums become due because the insured dies
within the period covered by the last premium payment he made before
assigning the policy, it is settled that the entire amount of the proceeds
(assuming the inapplicability of section 2035(b)(2)) is included in the
insured's gross estate.8 5 This is the correct result. By assigning the policy, the
ground. The refusal to trace the proceeds received by the donee of an outright gift constitutes a
rejection of the claim that the donee should be treated as an agent of the donor, although a
reasonable case can be made for treating the donee as the donor's representative for purposes
of charging the donor with the donee's sale and reinvestment of donated property. While the
donor retains no control over the donee's use of the donated property, they have an identity of
interests in the property that comes close to justifying the treatment of the donor and the donee
as a single tax unit insofar as the donated property is concerned. As already noted, however,
the courts have uniformly declined to so treat the donee. On the other hand, where a donor
makes a gift in trust, it typically will be a trust that he created and whose terms he dictated.
Consequently, even though the settlor retains no continuing control over the trustee, the trustee
could be treated as an agent of the donor for the limited purpose at hand, so that the trustee's
shifting of investments would be attributed to the donor in determining the amount to be added
to his gross estate.
83. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e)(1958). In the view of the authors, the amount included in
the donor's gross estate should be reduced by the aggregate amount of tax paid by the donee.
84. Similarly, I.R.C. § 691(b) allows both an income and an estate tax deduction for an
expense which constitutes a deduction in respect of a decedent, even though, if such item of
expense had been satisfied prior to the decedent's death, the resulting reduction in the dece-
dent's estate would have been mitigated by the tax savings obtained by virtue of the income tax
deduction that would have been allowed.
85. See Berman v. United States, 487 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1973); Bel v. United States, 452
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insured of course transferred the underlying economic components there-
in. s6 Since at the time of the insured's death, the value of the equity reserve
component and the term insurance coverage component combine to equal
the full amount of the proceeds paid, that is the amount that should be, and
is, included in the insured's gross estate.
B. Post-Assignment Premiums Become Due But Are Not Paid, Resulting
in a Lapse of the Policy.
If an insured lives long enough so that post-assignment premiums
become due, but neither the donee nor the insured makes the required
subsequent premium payments and thereby permits the policy to lapse
before the insured dies, what amount, if any, should be included in the
insured's gross estate? While it is conceptually a difficult question, perhaps
the most significant comment to be made on this issue is that it does not
appear ever to have arisen, suggesting either that the likely expectation of a
donor that the premiums will be paid at least for the next few years is
justified or that the issue has not been raised by the Service. Even though of
little practical significance, the question is sufficiently interesting to warrant
brief consideration.
While the result may appear harsh, it is possible (at least where the
assignment of the policy was not made in trust) that the amount to be
included should be the amount of proceeds that would have been payable on
the policy if it had been kept in force, less the amount of premiums that
would have been required to retain the insurance until the insured's death. 87
The amount normally to be included under section 2035 is the value of
the property transferred, without regard for whether the donee subsequently
sold, exchanged or lost his interest in the property. 88 As previously noted,
the position of the Commissioner (and the several courts that have con-
sidered the issue) is that the actual property transferred by the decedent is
included in his gross estate at its value at the estate tax valuation date,
irrespective of whether the donee retained the property. 89 The donee,
however, can affect the value of the donated property by various means,
such as by failing to maintain the property and protect it from deterioration.
Since the existence of an obligation to make payments in order to retain
F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972); Rev. Ru171-497 (situation 2), 1971-2
C.B. 329.
86. See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
87. The obligation to pay a premium to retain the insurance is roughly equivalent to an
encumbrance on the property. The unpaid premium therefore should be deducted as a proper
reflection of an outstanding debt-that is, the policy is treated as if it were still in existence, and
in that event the unpaid premium would be a debt on the property.
88. See note 82 supra.
89. This rule may not of course apply to gifts in trust. See note 82 supra.
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property does not bar its inclusion under section 2035 (because of the
implicit and irrebutable assumption that the donor would have made those
payments), the donee's failure to make the payments should not affect the
inclusion of the property. It could be argued, however, that the justification
for assuming that the donor would have made the required payments exists
only if such payments are actually made by the donor, the donee or by some
other party, since the fact of payment evidences that there was an adequate
economic motivation to make it. In the absence of actual payment, it might
be argued that the possibility that the donor would have paid the premiums is
too speculative. Contrary to those contentions, however, section 2035
focuses on the donor alone; and in general, except possibly for gifts in trust,
the donor will not be charged (indirectly or otherwise) with the actions of the
donee. The donor's motives and concerns will often differ substantially
from those of the donee, so that the donee's failure to maintain the insurance
protection is not a helpful guide to the probable course the donor would have
taken if he had not assigned the policy. The donor's failure to pay the
premium for the donee also provides little guidance, since his unwillingness
to make additional gifts does not suggest the course he would have taken had
he continued to own the policy.
If a policy lapses before the insured's death, can it be said to have any
value, other than the value of the equity reserve component if it is a straight
life policy? Where a donee of an outright gift dissipates his interest in
donated cash or stocks or realty, the property exists at the -date of the donor's
death even though it is not owned by the donee at that time. Cash need not
be traced since its value is deemed always to remain the same (of course,
that is not true economically, but for tax purposes, dollars constitute the
measure of value). If the donee sells or otherwise disposes of donated stock
or realty or a painting, the donated property nevertheless is valued at the
donor's death; again, however, the property does exist at that time. 90 When
a policy lapses, its term insurance coverage component ceases to exist and
as a result has no value thereafter. If a donee were given stock which
comprised a controlling interest in a corporation, and the donee mismanaged
the company into bankruptcy before the donor's death two years later, the
estate tax value of the stock would be zero, even though its reduction in
value was caused by the donee. A donee can therefore affect the amount in
the donor's gross estate by taking (or by failing to take) action which
reduces the value of the property; in this respect, the donee is no different
90. An interesting question (similar to the lapsed insurance problem) could arise if the
donated property were destroyed prior to the decedent's death. For example, if a painting the
donee received were consumed by fire it would have a zero value. If cash the donee received
were destroyed in a fire, that should reduce its value to zero for estate tax purposes, but tracing
the burned cash to the original gift might be difficult.
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from any other person whose actions may alter the value of the donated
property (for example, a re-zoning of donated realty may increase its value).
The donee's actions (or inaction) affecting the value of the donated property
are to be distinguished from the donee's retention of the donated property.
Arguably then, a lapsed policy might be included in the insured's gross
estate at a zero value, or at the value of its equity reserve component 9' at the
time of lapse if it is a straight life insurance policy.
Under another analysis, however, the value of a lapsed policy is much
greater than zero. The lapse of an insurance policy bears some similarity, in
substance, to the foreclosure of a mortgage on realty even though the risk
coverage provided by the insurer ceases to exist on the lapse of the policy.
The effect of the lapse is to shift the risk of the financial loss arising on the
premature death of the insured from the insurer (who has assumed the risk
under the insurance contract) to the assignee, who had been covered by the
policy. In either case (the ownership of realty or of an insurance policy), the
value of the bundle of rights involved can easily be determined at the
donor's death, and the donee's actual benefit from the property is limited to
its net value at the date the donee lost or surrendered the property. The value
of the realty (on the donor's death or the alternate date), however, is
included in the donor's gross estate even where the donee realized far less on
the sale or foreclosure of the property; it might also appear reasonable to
provide the same treatment for insurance coverage where the donee surren-
dered his insurance protection rights. It is therefore arguable that the lapse of
a policy should not have a substantial impact upon the amount included in
the insured's gross estate, unless the policy had been assigned by the donor
in trust. If there is an anomaly in providing different treatment for policies
transferred in trust, it exists because the Service's different treatment (which
is by no means settled) of'transfers in trust under section 2035 is anoma-
lous. 92 But, the only asset that the insured had to transfer was the claim
against the insurer as contrasted to risk coverage in the abstract. As already
noted, the insurer's obligation was terminated by the lapse. The resolution
of this question depends upon whether the assignee's allowing the policy to
lapse extinguishes the property interest transferred to him by the insured or
merely changes it in form. Since self-insurance for a loss is not an asset, the
assignee's assumption of risk (by releasing the insurer) cannot properly be
viewed as a change in form of an asset but rather is the undertaking of a risk
(i.e., a liability). The lapse of an insurance policy, therefore, should be
treated as a termination of the transferred property. The question then
remains as to how the terminated policy should be valued for purposes of
determining the amount (if any) includable in the insured's gross estate.
91. See the text accompanying note 93 infra for a discussion of how the equity reserve
component should be valued in this setting.
92. See note 82 supra.
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Section 2035 requires that the property transferred by the donor be
valued as of the estate tax valuation date, which for convenience we treat as
the date of his death. At the time that the policy lapsed, its value (if any) to
the policyholder was the equity reserve component since neither of the other
two components 93 remained. In fact, the actual value of the policy to the
policyholder was limited to its cash surrender value since that is all that he
could realize on the property, and the additional value represented by the
equity reserve is of benefit to a policyholder only where the policy is
retained in force. If the insured had kept the policy and had allowed it to
lapse, all that would have been included in his gross estate would be the
unconsumed remainder of the policy's cash surrender value, and so no
greater amount should be included where the policy lapsed in the hands of
his assignee.
C. Post-Assignment Premiums Become Due and Are Paid by the Insured.
If the insured lives long enough so that post-assignment premiums
become due, and the insured pays those premiums, it is settled that the entire
amount of the proceeds (possibly less some amount under section
2035(b)(2)) is to be included in the insured's gross estate.94 This result
clearly is correct, but its demonstration requires some elaboration. The
analysis used by the courts and the Commissioner has been incomplete,
possibly because the result seems so intuitively correct that a complete
analysis never seemed necessary. The failure of, courts to spell out an
analysis of this situation perhaps contributed to the difficulty the courts had
in determining the amount includable when the assignee, not the insured,
pays the post-assignment premiums.
Aside from the intuitive correctness of including the full amount of the
proceeds when the insured pays the post-assignment premiums, how is this
result justified conceptually? If we look at the transaction as we did when no
post-assignment premiums became due, there might appear to be a problem.
The portion of the proceeds attributable to the equity reserve component that
the insured transferred to the donee should be included because that was
transferred when the policy was assigned. But the value of the term insur-
ance coverage component, that is, the insurance protection for the period
93. The other two components are the term insurance coverage and the right of continua-
tion components.
94. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a) (1958). See, e.g., Estate of Compton v. Commissioner, 532
F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1976); Berman v. United States, 487 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1973); Vanderlip v.
Commissioner, 155 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 728 (1946). See also Estate of
Silverman v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 574, 576 (2d Cir. 1975). In Compton, the premiums on a
group-term life insurance policy, which became due after the insured had assigned the policy,
were presumably paid by the insured's employer. Nevertheless, the insured was deemed to be
the transferor of the premiums. See Estate of Porter v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 915, 919-20 (1st
Cir. 1971); Rev. Rul. 76-490, 1976-2 C.B. 300.
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covered by the last pre-assignment premium, would be zero at the time of
the insured's death, because by definition the insured outlived this period.
How, then, is that portion of the proceeds made up of the insurance element
(and that portion of the increase in the equity reserve beyond its value at the
time of the assignment attributable to post-assignment premiums) to be
included in the insured's gross estate? The explanation, as developed previ-
ously, is that there is a third economic component of a life insurance policy
- the right of continuation component (the right to purchase insurance
coverage for subsequent periods at a fixed price). 95 When no post-assign-
ment premiums become due, the term insurance coverage and equity reserve
components combine to equal the full amount of the proceeds, and the right
of continuation component is valueless. When post-assignment premiums
do become due and are paid by the insured, the term insurance coverage
component is valueless but the right of continuation and the equity reserve
components combine to equal the full amount of the proceeds.
Under a literal application of section 2035 the amount of premiums
paid by the insured within three years of his death, less the $3,000 annual
exclusions if available, also would be included in the gross estate. There is
no statutory bar to such a double inclusion and thus taxpayers must rely on
an administrative or judicial judgment not to elevate the letter of the statute
above its spirit. 96 Assuming that the premium payments exceed the annual
exclusion allowance, are not deductible and are not included in the insured's
gross estate under section 2035, they should not be treated as adjusted
taxable gifts for the same reason that they should be excluded from the reach
of section 2035-the premium payments have been subsumed in the pay-
ment of the insurance proceeds on maturity, and since the proceeds are
included in the insured's gross estate, the premiums should be excluded
from both the insured's gross estate and his adjusted taxable gifts to prevent
a doubling of the tax consequence.
D. Post-Assignment Premiums Paid by the Assignee.
1. Judicial Consideration of the Question. There are two cases
dealing with the tax consequences of the assignee's having made the post-
95. See Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 257 (1941).
96. In a recent case arising under pre-1976 facts, the Commissioner sought to include in the
insured's gross estate both insurance proceeds and the premiums paid thereon within three
years of death and in contemplation thereof. A trial judge for the Court of Claims held that only
the proceeds were includible because "it would be incongruous to include in the estate both the
proceeds of the policy and the premiums paid to an insurance company to keep the policy in
force." Peters v. United States, 77-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 13,209, at 18,159 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. 1977).
An analogous situation arises where the proceeds of an insurance policy owned by a third
party on a deceased shareholder's life are required by contract to be paid to the insured's estate
as partial payment for his corporate stock. In such a case, the proceeds may be included in the
insured's gross estate under section 2042(2) because of a retained incident of ownership. To
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assignment payments. The earlier of these cases is Liebmann v. Hassett,97 a
1945 decision of the First Circuit under the Revenue Act of 1926. In
Liebmann, the insured died two years after assigning incidents of ownership
in a life insurance policy to his wife. The two annual premiums which were
due between the assignment and the insured's death were paid by the wife.
The executrix conceded on appeal that the policy was assigned in contem-
plation of death, but she questioned the method of valuing the policy. The
court excluded from the insured's gross estate a portion of the proceeds of
the policy equal to the ratio that the two premiums paid by the wife bore to
the aggregate amount of premiums paid for the policy. The balance of the
proceeds was included by the court in the insured's gross estate. In so doing,
the court relied on the fact that, had the version of section 2042(2) then in
effect been applicable, only a portion of the proceeds would have been
included in the insured's gross estate due to the premium payment rule,
which was then in vogue. The court held that it would be inconsistent to
treat the insured as having transferred more under the antecedent of section
2035 than would have been included in the insured's gross estate under the
antecedent of section 2042(2) had it been applicable. Because Congress
abandoned the premium payment test in 1954, the Liebmann case has little
precedential value in this area.
The decisions of the Tax Court and the Second Circuit in Estate of
Morris R. Silverman98 are more recent and are therefore of far greater
significance than is the First Circuit's decision in Liebmann. At age 60,
Morris Silverman purchased a $10,000 policy insuring his life, the pre-
miums on which were payable monthly. Almost five years later, Morris
assigned the policy to his son. Within six months, Morris died, and the
assignment was held to have been in contemplation of death. 99 The son paid
the seven monthly premiums that became due after the assignment. At the
Tax Court proceeding in Silverman, the Commissioner sought to include the
entire $10,000 proceeds of the policy in the insured's gross estate with no
allowance for the seven monthly payments made by the assignee. 100 The
executor, however, contended that even if the policy had been assigned in
contemplation of death, only the dollar amount of premiums paid by the
avoid double taxation in such cases, the courts typically will reduce the value of the decedent's
stock by the amount of the insurance proceeds that are required to be paid to the insured's
estate towards the purchase of those shares. See Kahn, Mandatory Buy-Out Agreements for
Stock of Closely Held Corporations, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1, 32-33 (1969).
97. 148 F.2d 247 (Ist Cir. 1945).
98. 61 T.C. 338 (1973), aff'd, 521 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1975).
99. As previously noted, the 1976 Tax Reform Act substituted an automatic inclusion rule
for the subjective "contemplation of death" test that was applicable when the facts of Silver-
man took place.
100. 521 F.2d at 575.
Vol. 1977:941]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
insured were includable in his gross estate.101 The Tax Court rejected the
contention of both parties and included a portion of the proceeds:
The transfer of a life insurance policy in contemplation of death nor-
mally requires inclusion in the gross estate at face value . . . . In the
instant case however, the petitioner paid all the insurance premiums
after the assignment. Of total premiums amounting to $3,261.20, peti-
tioner paid $368.20 or 11.29 percent and the decedent paid $2,893 or
88.71 percent. Under these circumstances we feel that the petitioner
contributed to the value of the policy, and it would be inappropriate to
include in the gross estate that portion of the value which petitioner
contributed.
Throughout its existence, including the time of transfer, the policy
had a face value of $10,000. At the time of the decedent's death
however, a certain number of premiums were required to keep the face
value intact. It is apparent, therefore, that at the time the decedent
transferred the policy, only a portion of the premiums necessary to
maintain the face value payment on death had in fact been paid. The
petitioner's continued premium payments were thus a vital part of the
consideration necessary to secure full payment on the insurance policy
on decedent's death. To hold otherwise would tax the estate on an asset
greater than that which the decedent transferred. . . . We therefore
hold that the decedent's estate must include that portion of the face
value of the life insurance policy which the decedent's premium pay-
ments bore to all premium payments.1 2
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, rejecting the
executor's alternative contentions that only the cash surrender value of the
policy or the premiums paid by the insured should be included in his gross
estate. 103 In that appeal, the Commissioner chose to defend the Tax Court's
decision rather than renew his contention for the inclusion of the entire
amount of the proceeds. The Second Circuit was critical of the Tax Court's
decision to pro-rate the proceeds, and strongly suggested that the proper
treatment would be to include in the insured's gross estate the $10,000
proceeds less the $368.20 of premiums paid by the assignee. 104 While the
Government's brief also suggested that this was the proper treatment, it did
not urge the point on appeal but was content to defend the Tax Court's pro-
rata allocation.
2. Return of the Percentage of Premiums Test. The position adopted
by the Tax Court in Silverman is reminiscent of the percentage of premium
test that was once employed by the estate tax laws as part of the antecedents
101. Id.
102. 61 T.C. at 342-43 (citations omitted).
103. 521 F.2d at 577.
104. Id. at 578.
[Vol. 1977:941
LIFE INSURANCE
to section 2042(2). This test was eliminated by Congress, however, when it
adopted the 1954 Code. As noted previously, the congressional rejection of
the premium payment test was criticized by a minority of Congressmen and
by a few tax commentators. 10 5 While the Tax Court's decision by no means
signalled a return to that test in all situations, it may well have been based on
the identical assumptions that led some to favor the now discarded formula,
and a brief digression is warranted to examine the merits and failings of the
premium payment test. The dissenting members of the committee that
recommended the abolition of the premium payment test stated in part:
It is sought to justify the change as merely putting life insurance on
a par with other property which may be given away free from estate tax
if the gift is not made "in contemplation of death." But life insurance is
not like other property. It is inherently testamentary in nature. It is
designed, in effect, to serve as a will, regardless of its investment
features. Where the insured has paid the premiums on life insurance for
the purpose of adding to what he leaves behind at his death for his
beneficiaries, the insurance proceeds should certainly be included in
his taxable estate.106
The authors of C. Lowndes, R. Kramer & J. McCord, Federal Estate
and Gift Taxes, a prominent treatise on the subject of estate and gift
taxation, also were critical of the elimination of the payment of premium
test. The authors state:
Life insurance should not be taxed like other property because it is not
like other property. Regardless of whether or not life insurance is
'inherently testamentary', which, after all depends on how one defines
'inherently testamentary', the abolition of the premium payment test
opens the door for substantial estate tax avoidance. A man can pass
along unlimited amounts of property at his death without encountering
the estate tax by investing in life insurance and divesting himself of all
incidents of ownership in the insurance during his life.
It is true that a man can avoid an estate tax if he makes a complete
gift of other kinds of property during his life. He will, however, incur a
gift tax on the property given away. Moreover, he will suffer the
inconvenience which the loss of the property entails. Life insurance
may be given away before it has built up any substantial reserve values
with little or no gift tax. The principal present enjoyment which an
insured derives from life insurance is the thought that it will take care
of his dependents after his death. In the ordinary case this will not be
diminished by an assignment of the insurance to the intended benefi-
ciary. It is true that a man who irrevocably assigns his insurance during
his life cannot cash in the insurance to meet financial emergencies
105. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
106. H.R. REP. No. 1337. supra note 26, at B14, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4025, 4608.
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which may later arise. This detriment may, however, be more theoret-
ical than actual, since the assignee will normally be one of the insured's
intimate family group who will readily re-assign the insurance should
the need arise. 107
Despite the stature of the supporters of the premium payment test and
the vigor of their support, the test has nothing to commend it and was
properly abandoned by Congress. There is no rational connection between
the amount of insurance proceeds that would be taxed under a premium
payment test and the fundamental principles of estate taxation that underlie
the treatment of all other property items. For example, assume that Helen
owned a fully paid up policy insuring her life in the amount of $50,000. On
her 68th birthday, Helen assigned the ownership of the policy to her niece,
Matilda. The cash surrender value of the policy at that date was $42,000.
Since the policy was fully paid up, no further premiums were due. Helen
died four years later, and the proceeds of the insurance were paid to Matilda.
All but a few thousand dollars of the proceeds are attributable to the equity
reserve component in the policy that Helen assigned to Matilda more than
three years prior to her death. Under current law, none of the proceeds will
be included in Helen's gross estate; but the value of the gift (less the gift tax
annual exclusion) will be included in Helen's estate tax base under the
unified rate system. If a premium payment test were re-adopted, and if the
policy qualified as insurance, 10 8 all of the proceeds would be included in
Helen's gross estate. From a policy viewpoint, however, there clearly is no
justification for including any of the insurance proceeds in Helen's gross
estate. There can be no reason to distinguish Helen's assignment of the life
insurance policy from a gift of other property such as real estate.
Lowndes, Kramer and McCord apparently believe that the abuse in the
current estate tax treatment of life insurance proceeds occurs most flagrantly
where the life insurance is "given away before it has built up any substantial
reserve values with little or no gift tax. '" 109 The following two examples
demonstrate that there is no basis for that concern.
Assume that in Year One, X acquired a whole life policy insuring his
life in the amount of $100,000. The premium for the policy was $2,500 per
year. The following year, Year Two, after having made two premium
payments, X assigned the ownership of the policy to Y who paid the
premiums thereafter. At the time of the transfer, the cash surrender value of
the policy was $300, and X's reserve in the policy was only slightly larger.
Consequently, because of the $3,000 annual exclusion, X incurred no gift
tax liability. When X died a little more than four years after the assignment
107. C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. MCCORD, supra note 27, at § 13.4, at 327-28.
108. See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2042-1(a)(2), .2039-1(d) (1958).
109. C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. MCCORD, supra note 27, at § 13.4, at 328.
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was effected, Y had made four premium payments. Y then collected the
$100,000 insurance proceeds. Under section 2042(2), no part of the pro-
ceeds is included in X's gross estate. But if the premium payment test were
in force, one-third of the proceeds (approximately $33,000) would be
included in X's gross estate.
What connection is there between the two premium payments made by
X and the collection of the insurance proceeds? Each premium payment
made by X purchased both risk insurance coverage for the year involved and
an equity interest. The equity interest (some $300) that was given to Y when
the policy was assigned should not be included in X's gross estate. In this
respect the premium payment test is topsy-turvey in effect, in that the
greater the number of premiums paid by the insured, the greater the amount
of reserve in the policy that should be excluded from his gross estate; yet
under the premium payment test, each payment made by the insured prior to
the assignment will increase the amount included in his gross estate. The
risk coverage that X acquired was for a one-year period only and thus
expired at the end of Year Two. From whence, then, is the remaining
$99,700 of insurance proceeds derived? A relatively small portion of it
(some several thousand dollars) is attributable to the portion of the pre-
miums paid by Y which were allocated to Y's equity interest (reserve), and
surely no part of Y's premium payment should be included in X's gross
estate. Thus, an amount equal to the reserve in the policy as of X's death
should be excluded. The remainder of the proceeds (some $95,000) is
attributable to the risk insurance coverage purchased with the remaining
portion of the premium paid by Y for the year in which X died. There is no
justification for taxing the proceeds of risk coverage in the gross estate of X
if the coverage was acquired by Y.
But X did give Y something more than the equity reserve component
of the policy in Year Two. X also gave Y the term insurance coverage
component for the remainder of Year Two, and the right of continuation
component (the right to purchase risk coverage on X's life at a contractually
fixed price for years following Year Two). If X were in good health at the
time, the assignment of the right of continuation component would have no
value since anyone with an insurable interest could purchase risk coverage
on X's life for a premium of equal amount. If, however, X were in poor
health at that time, the right to purchase risk coverage at a price set for a
healthy insured would be of tangible value to Y. This extra benefit perhaps
should affect the valuation of X's gift for gift tax purposes. 1'3 So, also,
should the transfer of the term insurance coverage component for the
110. Under current practice, however, the gift tax valuation is made without regard to the
actual health of the insured. See generally Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6 (1958). In a comparable
situation, it has been held by several courts and the Service that in determining the value of
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remaining part of Year Two itself. But neither of these should alter the estate
tax consequences since any extra benefit assigned by X was given away
more than three years prior to his death.
It might be contended that the premium payment test is a rough means
of compensating the government for not taking the insured's health into
account in valuing the policy for gift tax purposes at the time it was
assigned. The test fails to qualify as a reasonable adjustment to compensate
for lost gift taxes for two reasons. First, there is an inverse relationship
between the number of premiums paid by the insured and the amount of
insurance protection assigned, and second, the number of premium pay-
ments made prior to the assignment does not bear even a remote relationship
to the health of the insured, whose health controls the value of the right to
continue the insurance coverage.
As a second example, assume that in Year One, H took out a $100,000
policy insuring his wife, W, who was the primary earner of the family. H
named himself as beneficiary of the policy. H had an insurable interest in
W. H paid all premiums on the policy for five years and then W died. None
of the proceeds are included in W's gross estate, and even the premium
payment test would not cause the inclusion of any of the proceeds. If,
instead, W had taken out the policy in Year One and paid one premium,
then assigned the policy to H six months later and died five years after that,
no justification exists for taxing a portion of the proceeds in W's gross
estate. In both situations, the insurance proceeds are largely attributable to
the risk coverage purchased under the policy and it is W's death which
causes the policy to mature; the fact that in one situation W paid one year's
premium and did not do so in the other does not warrant different estate tax
consequences.
In Silverman, the Tax Court excluded 11.29 percent of the proceeds
from the insured's gross estate because that percentage of the premiums had
been paid by the assignee."' No more rationality can be found in that
apportionment than existed in the premium payment test which Congress
rejected in 1954. Within three years of his death, the insured assigned a
straight life policy which had a value that was at least equal to his equity
insurance policies owned by a husband and wife on the lives of each other, who die in a
common disaster, the imminence of each insured's death immediately prior to the death of the
policyholder did not affect the valuation of the policy for estate tax purposes. See Estate of
Wien v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1971); Estate of Meltzer v. Commissioner, 439
F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1971); Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.
1970); Estate of Chown v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1970); Rev. Rul. 77-181, 1977-
I.C.B. 272. But cf. United States v. Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260, 262 (1941) (replacement value
rather than cash-surrender value considered best criterion of value, since the decedent may
have in the interim become uninsurable). The justification for not taking the insured's health
into account is discussed in the text accompanying notes 117-20.
111. 61 T.C. at 342.
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reserve, and surely no portion of that reserve should have been excluded
from his gross estate. The percentage of premiums paid by the assignee has
no relevance to the determination of the value of the interest transferred by
the insured. The failing of the Tax Court's formula becomes readily appa-
rent when tested by applying it to a variety of hypothetical facts. Consider,
for example, the situation in which an insured became seriously ill two years
after acquiring a life insurance policy and promptly assigned the policy to
his brother, who paid premiums for two additional years before the insured
died. It would be patently inappropriate to exclude one-half of the proceeds
from the insured's gross estate, since the insured transferred a policy worth
much more than half its face value at the time of transfer.
3. The Proposed Treatment. If the Tax Court's formula is unreal-
istic, how should the Silverman situation have been resolved? As noted
earlier in this Article, when an insured assigns away the ownership of a life
insurance policy, he is making a gift of three separate economic compo-
nents: the equity reserve component (his reserve in the policy), the term
insurance coverage component (the pure insurance coverage for the period
covered by his last premium payment), and the right of continuation compo-
nent (the continuing right to purchase that coverage at a fixed price for
subsequent periods). To determine the proper treatment for the assignee's
premium payments, it is helpful to examine these components separately
and to consider the extent to which any increase in their value between the
assignment and the date of the insured's death would be includable in the
insured's gross estate under a normal application of the principles of section
2035.
(a) The equity reserve component. The first property interest, the
amount of the insured's reserve in the policy at the date of assignment,
should be included in his gross estate as a transfer made within three years of
death. The size of the reserve will be greater at the date of the insured's
death than at the time of the gift because of two independent factors: first,
the reserve will increase at periodic intervals according to a rate of increase
established in the insurance contract (hereinafter called the "automatic
incremental increase" to the reserve); second, the reserve will be increased
by the portion of the assignee's premium payments that are allocated to the
policy's reserve plus any automatic incremental increase to that portion of
the reserve. Clearly, the addition to the reserve caused by the assignee's
premium payments and any automatic incremental increase to such addi-
tions made by the donee should be excluded from the insured's gross
estate.112
112. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e) (1958).
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The automatic incremental increase to the reserve which the insured
had at the time of the transfer raises a more troublesome question. It is well
settled that the post-transfer income received on property transferred within
three years of death is not captured by section 2035 for inclusion in the
donor's gross estate.113 An argument could be made for the application of
this rule to the situation under discussion, since the automatic incremental
increase to the insured's reserve bears considerable similarity to interest
income. However, it is significant that such incremental increases have not
been treated as realized income for income tax purposes. The reason that
such incremental increases are not included in a policyholder's gross income
is because the increases are not realized for income tax purposes (that is, the
incremental increase has not been severed from the policyholder's equity
interest); the provision that the policyholder can obtain the incremental
increase only by surrendering the policy constitutes such a substantial
restriction as to preclude the application of the "constructive receipt"
doctrine.I 4 The characterization of such incremental increases need not be
the same for estate tax purposes as it is for income tax purposes, but no
particular reason would seem to justify treating it differently in this context.
In general, the application of the estate tax laws has followed the income tax
concept of realization (or severance) in determining whether to include an
item in a deceased's gross estate.I 5 The income tax law's characterization
of the automatic incremental increase (as unrealized income) is on shaky
ground conceptually, however, and the treatment possibly reflects a policy
to favor investments in life insurance, rather than a neutral application of tax
principles. Little purpose would be served by extending this conceptually
suspect characterization in order to cause exclusion of an incremental
increase from a decedent's gross estate, especially since the exclusion from
section 2035 of post-donation income itself has no conceptual justification
and is attributable to several ill-reasoned decisions which became calcified
pillars of the tax law through the application of the doctrine of precedent.
113. Id. See also Commissioner v. Gidwitz' Estate, 196 F.2d 813, 817-18 (7th Cir. 1952);
Estate of James E. Frizzell, 9 T.C. 979, 986-90 (1947), aff'd sub nom. Burns v. Commissioner,
177 F.2d 739, 741 (5th Cir. 1949), acq. 1966-1 C.B. 2.
114. See Theodore H. Cohen, 39 T.C. 1055, 1062-63 (1963).
115. See, e.g., Harvey v. United States, 185 F.2d 463, 465-67 (7th Cir. 1950); Swartz v.
United States, 182 F. Supp. 540 (D. Mass. 1960). These cases hold that the gain recognized by a
donee on the sale of an asset which had been acquired as a gift from another constitutes income
to the donee from the donated property to the extent that the appreciation occurred after the
donee acquired the asset; therefore, when the "income" was used by the donee as partial
consideration for the acquisition of property in joint tenancy with the original donor, her use of
the "income" was treated as a "contribution" by the donee to the joint tenancy for purposes of
the percentage of consideration rule applied by section 2040. If the donee had not sold the
appreciated property she had been given by the donor, but instead had contributed it to the
purchase of property held in joint tenancy with the donor, the donee's contribution (including
the appreciated element of her contributed property) would be credited to the donor for
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Accordingly, the insured's gross estate should include the value of the
policy's equity reserve component1 16 at the date of his death less any portion
of the equity reserve component that was derived from the assignee's
premium payments.
(b) The term insurance coverage and the right of continuation
components. An insured's assignment of a policy also constitutes a gift of
the term insurance coverage and the right of continuation components. The
value of these components at the time of assignment is at least equal to the
portion of the premium previously paid by the insured which is attributable
to the remainder of the period for which that premium was paid. Thus, if the
insured paid a premium of $1,200 on March 1, for term insurance coverage
for one year, and the insured assigned the policy to his wife three months
later (on June 1), he would have made a gift having a value of at least $900
(3/4 of $1,200). If the insured is in good health, the above-described
allocation of the premium will accurately reflect the value of both compo-
nents. The amount of each premium will equal the value of the risk coverage
involved; the premium will have been set according to an actuarial determi-
nation of the risk assumed by the insurer, including the granting to the
policyholder of an option to continue that insurance coverage in future years
at a cost designed for healthy persons. Stating it differently, if the assignee
has an insurable interest in the insured, the assignee could purchase the same
amount of insurance coverage at the same price, and the value of the right of
continuation component is zero. However, if the insured is in poor health at
the time of the assignment, the premium payable for the term insurance
coverage will be less than the actual value of such insurance coverage;
consequently, the value of the insurance granted to the assignee (both the
coverage for the remainder of the period and the option to continue the
coverage at a bargain price) will exceed the premium allocation described
above.
If the insured's ill health were taken into account in valuing an assigned
policy for gift tax purposes, it would be necessary to determine the health of
the insured in the case of each such assignment, and to estimate the effect of
the insured's health on the valuation question by resorting to medical
evidence and actuarial expertise. Such inquiries would impose a great
administrative burden on both the government and on taxpayers. Presum-
purposes of section 2040. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c), Exs. (4) & (5) (1958). The severance of
the appreciation from the donated property caused it to be treated as the donee's income for
estate tax purposes, and it will not be so treated if it is not severed. Rev. Rul. 55-379, 1955-1
C.B. 449.
116. Even if it were decided that the automatic incremental increase of the insured's reserve
should be excluded, that will be a relatively small figure since the period involved cannot
exceed three years.
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ably because that burden would be too costly, the Service has not taken the
insured's health into account in valuing policies for gift tax purposes (or
where a decedent died owning a policy on the life of another person and the
policy must then be valued for estate tax purposes). 117
A similar question, involving the value at the date of gift of a donated
life insurance policy, arose in Estate of James Stuart Pritchard. 11 8 In that
case, the insured, after having undergone several operations for cancer,
"sold" a $50,000 face amount life insurance policy to his wife for approxi-
mately $10,000-the cash surrender value of the policy. The insured died
thirty days later. The court held that the $10,000 payment did not constitute
adequate and full consideration for the policy, which had a value far in
excess of its cash surrender value due to the insured's poor health. Accord-
ingly, the court held that the policy was transferred in contemplation of
death." 9 The court answered the taxpayer's contention that it would be
administratively impractical to approximate the actual life expectancy of
each donor of life insurance by pointing out that it was not necessary in that
case for the court to determine the actual value of the donated policy. The
court had to determine no more than that the policy's value was greater than
$10,000 to find that the consideration was inadequate. The case does not
deal with the question of whether the policy should have been valued for gift
tax purposes by taking the insured's illness into account, and the court
expressly declined to determine that value.
After the 1976 Act's adoption of an automatic rule of inclusion for gifts
made within three years of death and its integration of estate and gift tax
rates, there is particularly good reason not to consider the health of the
insured in valuing donated policies. If the insured's health were taken into
account, it is likely, because of administrative difficulties, that the govern-
ment would raise the issue only if the insured died shortly after making the
gift; in most such events the proceeds will be captured in the insured's gross
estate under section 2035. The principal revenue loss in not valuing a
donated policy in light of the insured's health is therefore a few years'
deferral of the transfer tax on any added value caused by the insured's poor
health, and that brief deferral will not likely justify the enormous adminis-
trative burden of attempting to determine the insured's actual life expec-
tancy.
For purposes of section 2035, the value of the term insurance coverage
117. See note 110 supra.
118. 4 T.C. 204 (1944).
119. Had the taxpayer been able to show that the transfer was for adequate and full
consideration, the policies would not have been included in the insured's gross estate as
transfers in contemplation of death, by virtue of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(c), 53 Stat.
121 (now I.R.C. § 2035(b)(1)).
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and the right of continuation component at the time of assignment is not
paramount. It is the value of these components at the time of the transferor's
death that controls. At that date, of course, the value of the term insurance
coverage component is zero, since by definition the insured has outlived the
period covered by the last premium he paid. The difference between the face
amount of the insurance (that is, the proceeds payable on the insured's
death) and the policy's reserve is attributable partly to the right of continua-
tion component that the insured transferred to the donee and partly to the
donee's having paid the subsequent premiums as they come due. The
proceeds, however, would not have been payable if the premiums had not
been paid, and so account must be given to the assignee's payment of those
premiums. Rather than treating each premium payment as the purchase of an
independent asset (risk coverage for a stated term), it is more accurate to
characterize such payments as a maintenance expense of the right of
continuation component. The insurance coverage element of a policy should
therefore be treated as a continuum and not as a collection of a number of
contractual arrangements-one for each term of a premium payment. In-
deed, it is this characterization of life insurance coverage as a continuum
that justifies the inclusion in an insured's gross estate of only the amount of
premiums paid by the insured on either a straight life or a term insurance
policy within three years of his death (where the policy itself had not been
transferred by the insured within three years of his death) despite the fact
that the entire proceeds of an accidental death policy are included in an
insured's gross estate where the insured paid the final premium thereon
within the three-year period prescribed by section 2035-that is, premiums
paid on term or straight life insurance are merely maintaining continuous
insurance coverage while a premium paid on an accidental death policy
constitutes a de novo purchase of the insurance coverage itself.12
0
Treating insurance coverage as a continuum or single asset is not only a
realistic view of the asset itself, it is necessary in order to accommodate the
legislative purpose for adopting section 2035 and to avoid great administra-
tive burdens. If a premium payment were treated for purposes of section
2035 as an independent purchase by the assignee of risk coverage for the
stated term, it might then be necessary to exclude from the insured's gross
estate the risk coverage element of the proceeds (that is, the difference
between the amount of the proceeds and the reserve), since that value would
then be deemed to have been added by the assignee. The purpose of section
2035, to prevent the use of lifetime transfers as a means of minimizing
transfer tax costs, would be frustrated, particularly where the insured was in
poor health when he assigned the policy. This method would also overstate
the amount added to the policy's value by the assignee. To prevent that
120. See Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 329. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
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frustration and overstatement, it would be necessary to value the risk
coverage element of the policy at the time of assignment and then deduct
that value from the risk coverage element at death to determine the amount
of the proceeds that actually are attributable to the assignee's premium
payment. This method would provide a more accurate reflection of the
assignee's addition to the value of the policy than would the method
utilizing the entire risk coverage element.
The objection to the above approach, however, is that it requires that an
appraisal be made of the health of the insured at the time of assignment and
that an actuarial and medical evaluation be made of his life expectancy at
that time. As noted above, the difficulties in making that determination and
the burden of exploring those issues led the government to value unmatured
insurance policies without regard to the actual health of the insured. 121 The
same factors point to the treatment of life insurance coverage as a continuum
in order to avoid the great difficulties of valuing the unmatured policy at the
time of assignment. Indeed, the factual problems raised by requiring such a
valuation of the policy at the time of assignment are reminiscent of the
problems that arose in determining whether a transfer was made in contem-
plation of death. Congress of course replaced the "contemplation of death"
test in 1976 with an automatic rule of inclusion just so that it could eliminate
both the administrative burden of making inquiries of this type and the
frequent factual errors made in resolving such issues. While it is true that the
contemplation of death rule involved questions of subjective intent that
would not be raised in examining the insured's state of health, it would still
be necessary in both situations to look into the past and determine some
aspect of an individual's personal state without having any access to infor-
mation from the person himself.
Even if the health evaluation method were correct in theory, it would
operate equitably only where the past health of the insured can be accurately
determined; the great likelihood that substantial errors will be made in
resolving such factual issues renders this approach undesirable. While the
treatment of the assignee's payments as maintenance of the right of continu-
ation component is somewhat draconic, it has the advantage of being
doctrinally supportable, not only for the reasons discussed above, but also
because such treatment is consistent with the perceptions of the usual
insured and his assignee. It also avoids the burdens and risks of factual error
that attend an approach which requires an evaluation of the insured's life
expectancy.
Viewing the assignee's contribution as a maintenance cost, the ques-
tion is whether the proceeds should be reduced by any portion thereof other
121. See Rev. Rul. 77-181, 1977-1 C.B. 272, and text accompanying notes 117-20 supra.
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than the portion allocated to the policy's reserve. Since the insured's gross
estate would have been reduced by such payments if he had retained the
policy and made the premium payments (that is, the cash used to pay the
insurance cost would no longer be part of the insured's assets), the assig-
nee's payment should be treated as a contribution by him to the extent that
the payment is allocated to the cost of purchasing insurance coverage (which
cost includes the insurer's expenses that are passed on to its policyholders).
Therefore, the amount of the portion of each premium payment that is not
applied to the policy's reserve should also be deducted from the proceeds
that are includible in the insured's gross estate. 122
V. CONCLUSION
The principle issue, then, is what amount should be included in an
insured's gross estate when he assigned a life insurance policy within three
years of death, the post-assignment premiums on which were paid by the
assignee. To arrive at the correct amount which should be included, the
proceeds of the policy should first be reduced by the portion of the assig-
nee's premium payments which are allocable to the policy's reserve and the
portion allocable to insurance coverage, which two portions together consti-
tute the entire amount of the premiums paid by the assignee. Additionally,
the automatic incremental increase of the reserve added by the assignee's
payments should be excluded, but this will be a relatively small amount and
a burdensome figure to compute. In the interest of simplicity and adminis-
trative ease, it would be preferable to include in the insured's gross estate
the entire amount of the proceeds of the policy less the aggregate amount of
premiums paid by the assignee. As mentioned above, the Government noted
this treatment as a possible solution in its brief on appeal in Silverman,123
but did not urge its adoption. The Second Circuit hinted that it favored this
approach, but since the Government was not pressing the issue, the court
refrained from passing upon it. The above approach would conform with
congressional aims and provide ease of administration without straining the
conceptual analysis of the transaction.
It is noteworthy that this proposed treatment is consistent with the
authors' analysis of the proper estate tax treatment of an insured's assign-
ment of a life insurance policy within three years of his death where the
donee permitted the policy to lapse. 124 The authors concluded that only the
value of the equity reserve component, if any, of a lapsed policy should be
122. Cf. Estate of Peters v. Commissioner, 386 F.2d 404 (4th Cir. 1967) (the value of a
surviving joint tenant's capital improvements are deducted from the value of jointly owned
property that must be included in the decedent's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2040).
123. 521 F.2d at 577.
124. See text accompanying notes 87-91 supra.
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included under section 2035. The donee's payment of premiums, under the
authors' analysis, does not constitute the de novo purchase of insurance
coverage but rather constitutes an expense of maintaining the right of
continuation component that the donee had acquired from the insured. A
donee's failure to maintain a policy will cause a reduction in its value just as
the donee's failure to maintain other types of donated property, such as real
estate orlivestock, will impair the value of the donated property.
Even if the authors' conclusion that only the equity reserve component
of a lapsed policy is captured by section 2035 is not accepted, a contrary
holding that the face amount of a lapsed life insurance policy is to be
included in the insured's gross estate is reconcilable with the principal
aspects of the authors' conclusion concerning policies which did not lapse.
If the donee's failure to pay the required premiums would not affect the
amount included in the insured's gross estate (contrary to the authors'
conclusion), then obviously the donee's payment of such premiums should
not affect the amount so included. This analysis, however, would not
warrant a reduction in the insured's gross estate for the amount of premiums
paid by the donee, and that fact alone appears sufficient to justify the
authors' view that only the cash value of a lapsed policy is caught by section
2035.
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